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Abstract: This paper selectively synthesizes much of the research on Latin American 
and Caribbean labor markets in recent years.  Several themes emerge that are 
particularly relevant to on going policy dialogues. First, labor legislation matters, but 
markets may be less segmented than previously thought. The impetus to voluntary 
informality, which appears to be a substantial fraction of the sector, implies that the 
design of social safety nets and labor legislation needs to take a more integrated view 
of the labor market taking into account the cost-benefit analysis workers and firms 
make about whether to interact with formal institutions.  Second, the impact of labor 
market institutions on productivity growth has probably been underemphasized. 
Draconian firing restrictions increase litigation and uncertainty surrounding worker 
separations, reduce turnover and job creation, and poorly protect workers.  But theory 
and anecdotal evidence also suggest that they, and other related state or union induced 
rigidities, may have an even greater disincentive effect on technological adoption, 
which accounts for half of economic growth.  Finally institutions can affect poverty 
and equity, although the effects seem generally small and channels are not always 
clear. Overall, the present constellation of labor regulations serves workers and firms 
poorly and both could benefit from substantial reform.   
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This paper synthesizes much of the research on Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) labor 
markets in recent years.  Though covering many disparate topics, it does not attempt to be 
comprehensive, but rather stresses themes that have emerged as central in the work of the region.   
Several themes emerge particularly relevant to on-going policy dialogues: 
 
1. Labor legislation matters, but markets may be less segmented than previously thought.  
The expanding literature in LAC on non-wage costs, firing restrictions, and nominal wage 
rigidities suggests that labor regulations do affect most labor outcomes.  The magnitude of these 
effects is still in dispute.  What does seem clear is that while wage rigidities have been 
instrumental in generating high unemployment during crises, the emerging view that an 
important part of informality may be “voluntary,” suggests that the traditional focus on 
segmentation in the Harris-Todaro tradition may be overstated in normal periods.   
 
However, there are substantial inefficiencies and distortions in the labor codes that give 
incentives to both workers and firms to avoid formal institutions. The value of benefits- 
training, pensions, unemployment compensation- is often greatly misaligned with productivity 
levels and what workers or firms pay either explicitly or implicitly.  This impetus to voluntary 
informality implies that the design of social safety nets and labor legislation needs to take a 
more integrated view of the labor market taking into account the cost-benefit analysis workers 
and firms make about whether to interact with formal institutions.  This analysis incorporates 
the benefits of such interactions, the availability of informal substitutes, and the weighing of any 
greater risk exposure against the benefits of being independent and entrepreneurial. 
 
2. The impact of labor market institutions on productivity growth has probably been 
underemphasized. Draconian firing restrictions increase litigation and uncertainty surrounding 
worker separations, reduce turnover and job creation, and poorly protect workers.  But theory 
and anecdotal evidence also suggest that they, and other related state or union induced rigidities, 
may have an even greater disincentive effect on technological adoption which accounts for half 
of economic growth.  In this sense, the labor market must be viewed as an key part of the 
National Innovation System.  These issues take on a heightened importance in the context of 
more open economies. While there appear to be few long run adverse impacts of trade 
liberalization, reaping the benefits of greater integration will require greater attention the 
interactions between trade and labor regulation.  
 
3. Institutions can affect poverty and equity, although the effects seem generally small and 
channels are not always clear. The majority of earnings differentials are generated by human 
capital endowments, not labor market institutions, and labor reforms have had indeterminate 
effects.  Some regulations, such as minimum wages, clearly compress the earnings distribution, 
but if set too high can have opposite effects on household income distribution and poverty. 
There remain poorly understood differences in conditional earnings and patterns of employment 
along the lines of race, ethnicity and gender (although the evidence for discrimination based 
segmentation is weak) and related to unmeasured characteristics (early human capital, labor 
market connections).  In particular, the observed female differentials and concentration in 
informal self employment seem driven by preferences related to household responsibilities, 
although in some cases labor provisions discourage women’s regulated hiring.  
 
Overall, the present constellation of labor regulations serves workers and firms poorly and both 
could benefit from substantial reform.     2
II. Trends over the last decade 
 
a.  Overall evolution
1 
 
In the 1990s, employment grew faster than the working age population until 1998
2 after which it 
declined.  Despite higher GDP growth rates than in the 1980s, (3.9 v. 1.1 percent), the rate of 
employment growth was lower (2.9 v. 2.1), although Stallings and Peres (2000) argue that the 
employment-output elasticity during the 1990s was quite similar to what was observed during the 
1960s and 1970s.  There is therefore some disagreement around whether the region has entered a 
period of “jobless growth” (perhaps related to changes in output composition) or simply a cyclical 
slowdown.  Further, this inverted-U employment growth obscures great heterogeneity in the region.  
The employment rate showed a downward trend in Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador and Uruguay while 
the reverse was true in Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela and 
Caribbean countries.  Finally, these trends have occurred concomitant with a continuous expansion 
of labor force participation, with a particular increase in female participation from 44 to 50 percent 
between 1990 and 2000, that has exacerbated the challenge of creating sufficient good jobs.  
 
Real wages increased in the formal sector of the economy in almost all Latin American countries 
during the 1990s. By 2000, the median wage for selected Latin American countries was 15 percent 
higher than the level observed in 1990, although in many cases, with the notable exception of Chile,   
still below the levels of the 1980s.
3  The upward trend was particularly strong in Bolivia, Chile, 
Costa Rica, Guatemala and Nicaragua, where real wages in 2000 were well above 20 percent of what 
was observed in 1990. Formal sector real wages increased in Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru 
and Uruguay, remained relatively constant in Argentina and Brazil, and clearly fell in Venezuela - 
declining 35 percent between 1990 and 2000.  The  wage gains were likely driven by productivity 
increases in the modern part of the economy. Saavedra (2003) pools data from different sources for 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Peru, and finds a clear positive correlation between labor productivity 
and real wages in manufacturing during the 1990s. Aggregate labor productivity, however, remained 
stagnant growing at an annual rate of  –0.03 percent per year (IDB 2004). 
 
LAC has some of the highest unemployment rates in the world.(ILO 2001) Unemployment rates 
have been rising across the 1990s in Argentina, Colombia, Chile, Uruguay, and Venezuela, 
experiencing a jump in 1998 when employment rates began to fall amidst expanding participation.  
By 2000, the median open urban unemployment rate among Latin American countries was 9 percent. 
Argentina, Colombia and Panama reached levels above 15 percent, while it continued to be 
particularly low in Mexico (2.2%).  In Caribbean countries for which data are available, urban 
unemployment decreased during the 1990s. Increasing urban unemployment tends to be less driven 
by shedding in the formal sector, and more due to reduced access to the market, especially by the 
young.   
 
However, the incidence of long-term unemployment has not increased significantly. (see IADB 
2004).  The incidence of longer unemployment spells is still low compared to Eastern European 
countries and other developed countries; during the 1990s the incidence of unemployment spells 
longer than one year was 11 percent among Latin American countries but 42 percent among 
                                                 
1 This section draws on background work by Saavedra 
2 based on information from household surveys compiled by the International Labor Organization (ILO). 
3 CEPAL’s early evaluations found if anything a positive impact on wages (see Weller 2000) Stalling and Peres (2000).     3
Continental Europe and Eastern European countries. However it is higher than in the U.S, where it 
affects only 7.4 percent of the unemployed.  The continued low rate may reflect the possibility to 
enter the informal sector and/or discouraged workers moving into inactivity (IADB) although Bosch 
and Maloney (2004) find that such movements tend to be procyclical, for example, reaching their 
nadir during the crisis in Mexico. 
 
Part of the fall in employment and rise in unemployment the early 2000s may be due to decreased 
downward real flexibility of wages and the unfinished business of macro stabilization.  As 
Gonzalez (1999) has noted, lower inflation rates throughout the region  imply that the adjustment to 
a recession occurs through quantities instead of prices as might traditionally have occurred.  This 
loss of flexibility also implies that other rigidities may have become more binding.  More generally, 
many countries have been struggling with managing the expectations generated by the unfinished 
business of macro stabilization, including rigidities introduced by employing exchange rate anchors, 
the disruption caused by their traumatic abandonment, or recessions associated with the collapse of 
under regulated financial sectors. 
 
Despite growth in employment during the nineties, the share of workers covered by formal sector 
benefits has diminished. As summarized in Saavedra (2003), several characteristics that may be 
related to job quality showed negative trends.  The percentage of workers with access to health and 
pension benefits has diminished in most countries, the share of temporary contracts within the 





In many countries, globalization has received special attention as a cause of increased 
unemployment. Isolating the impact of trade reform is complex since cuts in tariffs and quotas have 
occurred concomitant with, and in fact, as parts of stabilization plans seeking to eliminate the 
adverse expectational consequences of long standing macroeconomic balances.  That said: 
 
Increased openness does not appear correlated with unemployment:  Beyond the initial 
adjustments there appears to be little evidence to indict trade reforms for causing higher rates of 
unemployment.  Anecdotally the region’s more aggressive trade integrators - Chile and Mexico -  
have, if anything, among the most modest rates of unemployment. Marquez and Pages (1998) argue 
that while liberalization appeared to reduce employment per unit, the expansion of production makes 
the overall impact of liberalization on employment statistically insignificant. In fact, IADB (2003), 
using household surveys for 10 countries, argued that it increased employment and did not have any 
significant impact on unemployment.  Their overall conclusion is consistent with the finding that, 
internationally, there is no significant relationship between openness of countries (exports plus 
imports over output) and their levels of unemployment.   
 
Or with  informality.  The tendency towards somewhat higher informality does not seem particularly 
due to trade.  Though the sector has absorbed some of the workers displaced by foreign competition, 
this is probably not the entire story as discussed below.  Argentina has seen a rise in informal 
salaried work (Gasparini 2000) but the trend predates liberalization by half a decade suggesting other 
forces.  More exposed sectors tend to be more formal throughout the region and there is relatively 
                                                 
4 This section draws heavily on Maloney (2002).   4
little evidence of increased subcontracting (Sanchez, Joo and Zappala 2001) in Mexico that would 
suggest a large subcontracting out of formerly formal jobs for competitiveness purposes.   
 
Wages have probably benefited over the medium term: Conditional wages are, in fact, higher in 
industries more exposed to trade. IADB (2004) documents numerous studies suggesting employment 
declines during the adjustment process, particularly in industries with substantial rents, and among 
specific demographic groups  but assert that there is no empirical basis for a permanent decline. The 
widening skill earnings gap discussed below is observed in all countries that liberalized their 
economies, but seems less directly related to trade per se than to greater skill biased technology 
flows common around the world.  
 
The emerging jobs seem desirable.  Though sample sizes are small, surveys of maquila  workers 
suggest these jobs are as attractive (see for example, Sargent and Matthews 1999) or more so than 
alternatives and Feenstra and Hanson report (1996) that such firms tend to demand more in terms of 
skills than other industries.  Employees in the flower industry in Ecuador and the fruit industry in 
Chile earn more and have more stable incomes than those in traditional industries (de Ferranti, et al 
2002)in the agricultural sector. Sanchez, Joo and Zappala (2001) argue that micro firms that are 
more closely linked to large (and hence more likely to be tradeables producing) firms earn premia of 
around 30 percent on non-linked micro firms.  
 
Worker risk   Despite concerns that trade liberalization would lead to greater worker uncertainty 
(Rodrik 1997), at present there is little evidence of it. Most recently, IADB (2004) finds no evidence 
of reallocation between industrial subsectors and Wacziarg (2001), using a global panel including 
LAC, finds only weak and borderline significant effects.  One key transmission mechanism, an 
increased wage elasticity of labor driven by higher product elasticities, has not materialized in 
Colombia or Chile and shows only fragile appearance in Mexico (Fajnzylber and Maloney, 
forthcoming).  Further, extracting the permanent component of worker income variance in the 
Mexican urban labor survey, Krebs, Krishna and Maloney (2004) find no increase in the permanent 
component of risk, but a transitory increase corresponding to the adjustment period.    
 
In sum, there are transitory impacts of trade liberalization, but openness does not appear correlated 
with many of the expected evils.  There is actually surprising low reallocation after liberalization, no 
permanent changes in unemployment, mixed impacts on wages in the medium term, an expansion of 




•  Measurement of labor market outcomes:  There is some concern about lack of cross- 
country comparability of labor market indicators.  It may be that Mexico’s consistently 
lower unemployment rates reflect a better functioning labor market than, say than that of 
Argentina with much higher secular levels, or it may perhaps reflect measurement 
differences, including those arising from how workers approach the standard survey 
questions.   
 
•  Complementary policies:  Recent work in the region, particularly on NAFTA, 
increasingly stresses that trade reform offers opportunities, but it is not a panacea that 
obviates reforms in other areas.  Exposure to international competition may make certain 
labor market distortions more critical, but as yet there is little work studying the 
necessary complementary policies in the areas of legislation, collective bargaining, skill 
accumulation, and active labor market policies.  It goes without saying that raising the   5
quality of human capital has been a critical ingredient in the East Asian Miracles’   
success in  the world market. 
 
•  Are labor market rigidities preventing more adjustment?  As noted above, what the 
IADB found surprising was the low level of intersectoral allocation of workers and, 
overall, the literature has found modest changes in rates of turnover. Again, a much 
broader agenda is required on the impact of regulation on technological adoption, that 
would, in all probability, increase both flows, and the ability of small firms to exploit 
economies of scale.   
 
 
 III. Protecting Workers 
 
The issue of the optimal design of worker protections is complicated and the region has made some 
small progress on the issue in recent years.  This section discusses the importance of the 
phenomenon of informality, the deficiencies of extant employment protections, the impact of non-
wage costs, the employment and poverty implications of minimum wages, and the impact of unions. 
Heckman and Pages (2004) have summarized much of the recently emerging literature and only 
select references will be mentioned here.  A theme throughout this section is that the study labor 
legislation needs to move away from a traditional focus on segmentation and job creation in a static 
sense, toward a focus on the labor market as an integral part of the National Innovation System, the 
constellation of institutions and firms that are involved in dynamic productivity gains through 






The informal sector merits treatment first not only because it is ostensibly the largest mass of 
unprotected workers, but also because recent evolution in thinking has implications for the design of 
social protection systems.  
 
The informal sector comprises both workers preferring formal sector employment (involuntarily 
informal) and those preferring the qualities of unregulated entrepreneurship.  In motivation 
surveys from Brazil and surveys of workers leaving formal employment in Mexico, 60-70% report 
preferring informal self employment for reasons of independence and higher earnings.
6 Though 
difficult to measure job characteristics make wage comparisons faux amis for establishing 
segmentation, numerous studies have established higher earnings among informal workers, 
particularly the urban self employed.
7  Recent studies for Brazil and Bolivia that attempt to control 
for selectivity into the sector find that predominantly informal salaried workers at the bottom of the 
salary scale within any skills set face a significant wage disadvantage vis-á-vis formal jobs.
8 
Attempts to compare welfare more directly find a premium to being informally self employed in 
Bolivia (Arias and Sosa 2004), consistent with the sociological evidence from Mexico finding self 
employment is often considered a step up from salaried work.  As discussed below, women appear to 
                                                 
5  See background papers by Maloney and Saavedra 
6, Cunningham and Maloney (2002), Maloney (2004) 
7 See Yamada (1996), Marcouiller, Ruiz and Castilla and Woodruff (1997), Maloney (1999), Saavedra and Chong 
(1999), Gong and van Soest (2002).   
8 Tannuri and Pianto (2003) and Tannuri, Pianto and Arias (2004).   6
find that self employment allows a better balancing of home and work responsibility. For some 
workers, informality offers more flexibility and mobility opportunities than the patronage-tenured-
based formal sector, for instance, Bolivian indigenous workers do not face earnings gaps with 
respect to non-indigenous in informal jobs contrary to the formal sector.
9 A sizable group of 
informal salaried workers would value at least partially the benefits that usually are tied with a 
formal labor contract, but they cannot afford these benefits due to their lower productivity and/or due 
to the fact that benefits are usually bundled with other undesired but costly programs. In this light, 
the equation of “decent work” to formal work is probably not helpful.  The informal sector is very 
heterogeneous and maybe best approximated by an upward tier of largely voluntarily informal 
workers (including most selfemployed and some informal salaried) and a smaller lower tier for 
which the sector functions as a safety net. The relative size of these groups may vary across 
countries depending on overall productivity levels and labor institutions. 
 
The relative size of the informal sector is, in the long run, related to demographic and productivity 
related factors rather than to distortions.  Crude regressions using pooled OECD/LAC data sets 
show that the relationship of the share of self employment and formal sector productivity is log 
linear and most of the variance is driven by demographic variables, suggesting the that decision to 
go into self employment is partly driven by the opportunity cost measured in terms of formal 
employment foregone.  Firing cost measures and social security taxes appears significant but of 
second order.
10 Wage gaps between workers in small and large firms in the region are similar to 
those in the U.S (IDB 2004). 
 
In the short to medium term, sector size does reflect the macro economic situation and how much 
adjustment occurs through quantities v. real wages and the incentives of firms to become formal.  
The large expansion of the sector in Colombia after 1995 occurred concomitant with a dramatic fall 
in earnings relative to the formal salaried sector, suggesting that substantial nominal rigidities were 
preventing the necessary adjustments to crisis.  Further, as Rama and MacIsaac (1999) point out, laid 
off workers from privatizations or other downsizing frequently wind up in informal self 
employment.  On the other hand, in Mexico, the informal self employment sector expanded from 
1988-1991 concomitant with a relative rise in its earnings, suggesting a boom in the non-tradeables 
sectors that was particularly attractive to informal entrepreneurs. The overall sluggish wage growth 
in the informal sectors in many countries suggests that the sector has been hit hard by recessions. 
Furthermore, high compliance costs of regulations to start and run a business and low benefits tilt the 
cost-benefit ratio of informal entrepreneurs to remain informal. Costly procedures for registration 
and business expansion, negative tax incentives and the poor performance of public and private 
services (including the judiciary and credit access) yield low benefits to become formal. Hence, 
reforms should take an integrated view of how to change the incentives for both workers and firms 
to become formal. 
 
Patterns of entry, exit and mortality in informal self employment are similar to those in the US. 
Patterns of entry into self employment are observed later in mid-life, consistent with the existence of 
credit constraints-the sector is not a sector of entry. Evidence from Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and 
Peru, suggest that young workers engage in informal salaried employment, generally for short 
periods of time, while self employment is most likely among middle aged workers.  Overall the 
“precariousness” arising from high rates of turnover of the sector may simply be due to high 
mortality rates found among small firms everywhere. 
                                                 
9 Tannuri, Pianto and Arias (2004). 
10 Maloney (2001)     7
 
Nor are informal sector employees necessarily uncovered.  Evidence discussed below suggests that 
the minimum wage is, in fact, more binding in the informal salaried sector than the formal in many 
countries.  Further, in Peru, casual evidence suggests that informal sector workers are covered by 
vacation benefits and receive the holiday bonus salary.  Both lend support to the idea that much of 
the informal sector is not  necessarily inferior, but offers a package of characteristics that may 
dominate – in the cost benefit decision making process of workers and firms- that in the formal 
sector.  When we add the observation that the mean stay in the sector is very short, generally around 
a year in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico; that many informal salaried workers are working for 
relatives; and that substantial vocational and on the job training appears to occur in the sector, the 
classic view of a stagnant pool of rationed out and unprotected workers appears to be inadequate. As 
a first approximation, it may be better to consider it as largely an entry sector for poor and poorly 
educated workers that corresponds to the kinds of temporary jobs that youth in the industrial 
countries take as they shop for careers, although the earnings potential of many informal salaried is 
constrained by the low and stagnant productivity of small firms in the region. 
 
This discussion implies a substantial change in the labor market research agenda:  
  
•  Discussions of job quality must move away from dichotomies based purely on coverage 
by formal institutions.  A voluntary, unconstrained move into informality implies a 
superior job, even without benefits.  A more complete set of diagnostics of job quality 
need to be developed. 
 
•  A substantial share of “voluntary” informality suggests that the level of segmentation 
may be substantially less than previously imagined and the dualistic paradigm 
overstressed. Arguing that 50% of the labor force is rationed out of formal employment 
at a demand elasticity of approximately 0.4 implies very high levels of wage rigidity. If, 
however, much or most is voluntary, the level of segmentation may be lower or non-
existent.  As discussed, Mexico has a large informal sector despite little evidence of 
either minimum wage or union induced nominal rigidities. 
 
•  Labor market policy, and social protection policy more generally, needs to be viewed in 
a more integrated framework to ensure incentives are correct across the entire labor 
market.  Saavedra and Chong (1999) and Levenson and Maloney (1996) both argue that 
the decision to comply with regulations as a firm can be understood as the result of 
weighing the costs and benefits of participation in social institutions more generally.  The 
same calculus applies to workers who will weigh the value of social benefits relative to 
what arrangements can be made informally, against the tax, implicit or explicit, that being 
a registered employee implies.  As examples, training contributions in Colombia, for 
example, are 2 percent of payroll but are not valued by firms or workers; health care and 
social security systems are notoriously inefficient, at one point estimated at 25 percent of 
revenues in Mexico, and of poor quality; and pension funds are frequently insolvent and 
often have a strong redistributive dimension. Thus, reforms should focus on the most 
binding constraints and consider the interactions between labor regulations and other 
aspects of the investment climate affecting the incentives to become formal. 
 
The implications for policy are critical.  If most workers are rationed out of formal jobs, 
then expansion of social safety nets is welfare improving.  However, in the alternative 
view offered,  expanding inefficient or narrowly designed policies may backfire and   8
actually expand the number of informal. As an example, extending basic universal basic 
medical care not linked to other dimensions of formality, while perhaps desirable to reach 
those truly excluded, is implicitly a subsidy to those contemplating leaving formal 
protections for informal entrepreneurship.  Overall, this probably justifies a shift in 
emphasis from the burden of social protections, and labor market rigidities overall, 
to an evaluation of their efficiency and design.  Since workers are likely to weigh the 
package of formal sector protections, social policy needs to treat the entire protection 
system as a whole, integrating the various complementarities among government 
programs as well as the private alternatives for protection through community or private 
mechanisms.  
 
Moreover, besides reforms to improve the overall investment climate, there might be 
room for bundled interventions to give smaller firms flexibility and align their incentives 
to participate in formal institutions. One example is special labor provisions to 
accommodate non-wage costs for smaller firms and incentives (e.g., partial tax credits, 
facilitated access to market-based financing, business support services) to become formal 
in other dimensions (being registered, reporting taxes). These should be engineered in a 
way that helps reduce monitoring costs by inducing firms to self-reveal their scale of 
operations (for example, requiring compliance with minimum tax and labor regulations to 
obtain bidding rights in government purchases and access to business development 
programs) and phased out gradually as firms increase their scale of operation. Learning 
from the experience of welfare reform and small business support programs in the U.S 
and similar experiences in other countries, a substantial research project is in order to 
develop such an approach. 
 
•  Issues of productivity enhancement merit as much attention as reducing rigidities 
induced unemployment or informality.  Informal employment in firms of relatively low 
technology and capital intensity can only be attractive if the overall level of labor 
productivity in the formal sector is low also.  To the degree that current legislation 
impedes investment in physical or human capital, or prevents the efficient organization 
and operation of firms, it perpetuates the low levels of productivity throughout the 
economy.  Many of the unanswered questions surrounding this topic are discussed below 
in greater specificity. 
 
 
b. Existing employment protection legislation  
 
Employment protection legislation regulates (i) available contractual forms, (ii) special rules 
favoring hiring of particular groups, (iii) conditions for firing, and (iv) worker compensation and 
other firing costs.  Conceptually, for reasons detailed below, the present system of proscribing firing 
of workers, except for gross misconduct, probably serves both workers and firms poorly.  However, 
the literature has encountered a series of empirical problems that make it difficult to draw causal 
relationships and extract general conclusions: difficulties endemic to cross-country analysis, 
problems of creating standardized measures of de jure employment protection, and the sometimes 
limited connection of de jure to de facto enforcement.  That said:  
 
There is no clear cut evidence that employment protection increases overall employment. Rules 
that protect employment and make firing difficult act as a tax on labor that, theoretically, may lead to 
reduced firing during bad times and hiring during good times, as well as having a negative impact on 
the creation of new businesses. The net effect of regulation on employment depends on the relative   9
importance of these different sources, and thus remains an open empirical question. The 
international cross-section evidence, while mixed, generally concludes that employment protection 
reduces net employment.
11  The evidence from Latin America, at this point, it also mixed and is best 
summarized in Heckman and Pages (2004).  In their own work they find evidence that the level of 
indemnities for dismissal decreases employment in the OECD although, in contrast to their previous 
findings with smaller samples, it has no significant impact in LAC.  They speculate that this may be 
due to the high level of heterogeneity in worker characteristics across countries.  Mondino and 
Montoya (2000), and Saavedra and Torero (2002) find a negative relationship for Argentina and 
Peru respectively. In contrast, Pages and Montenegro (1999), and Paes de Barros and Corseuil 
(2000) find no significant effect for Chile and Brazil, respectively. 
 
Employment protection does reduce turnover.  More restrictive legislation is expected to reduce 
hiring and firing so we should observe that it also reduces labor turnover since employed workers 
will tend to spend more time on a particular job.  Though LAC shows much higher levels of turnover 
than the OECD, in spite of more stringent firing restrictions, Maloney (2001) argues that the 
systematic difference largely disappear once the lower level of education in LAC is accounted.   
However, the Marquez index of job protection does indeed lead to higher tenure.  At the country-
level, Kugler (2000) and Torero (2004), and Gonzaga (2003) provide evidence that higher protection 
is associated with lower turnover in Colombia, Peru and Brazil, respectively although  Paes de 
Barros and Corseuil (2001) do not find a significant relationship for the latter. It is also important to 
note, however, that hiring and firing can occur either because a worker joins or leaves an existing 
firm, or because a firm is created or destroyed. Available empirical evidence tends to confirm the 
latter channel of adjustment where firing costs are high.
12 In Latin America, the report Good Jobs 
Wanted (IDB, 2004) confirms that worker flows are high in all countries, relative to the OECD, 
irrespective of the level of employment protection granted by their legislation. The authors argue 
that this result suggests that employment creation and destruction is closely linked to firm creation 
and destruction, rather than to hiring and firing by existing firms.   
 
The evidence on the net impact of lower turnover, and lower job creation is, predictably, also 
mixed.  The international evidence is again mixed.
13  In Latin America, Kugler (2000) finds a 
positive and significant relationship between both variables for the case of Colombia. Similarly, 
Pages and Montenegro (1999) and Montenegro and Pages (2004) show that in Chile higher 
employment protection leads to a decline in the demand for unskilled workers. 
 
Employment protection changes the composition of employment. When hiring and firing becomes 
difficult, firms will tend to hire and retain only those workers who are viewed as highly productive, 
relative to their cost. Because education and experience, which generally appear to be positively 
correlated with labor productivity, vary across demographic groups this implies that firms will be 
more willing to hire certain types of workers than others. For the OECD, Nickell (1997) finds that 
higher protection is associated with lower levels of aggregate employment, but finds no evidence of 
                                                 
11 Lazear (1990), Grubb and Wells (1993), Addison and Grosso (1996), Nickel (1997), Nicoleta and Scarpetta (2001), 
and Addison and Texeira (2003) find a negative relationship between employment protection and the employment rate 
using data for various countries, while Addison, Texeira and Grosso (2000) and Freeman (2001) find no relationship 
between the two. A summary of the literature by Addison and Texeira (2001) concludes that, taking into account all 
available evidence, employment protection reduces net employment. 
12 Using data from OECD countries, Blanchard and Portugal (2001) show that more restrictive legislation tends to reduce 
labor turnover in the short-run, but not in the long run (more than 12 months).  
13 Elmeskov, Scarpetta and Martin (1998), Lazear (1990), and Addison and Grosso (1996) find a positive relationship 
between employment  protection and unemployment, while Blanchard (1998), Nickell (1997) find no significant 
relationship. Addison and Texeira (2001) then disaggregated unemployment in three components and find that 
employment protection increases structural unemployment, long-term unemployment and youth unemployment.   10
significant differences across groups.  Montenegro and Pages (2004) find that higher protection in 
Chile is associated with lower employment rates among young workers, women, and unskilled 
workers.  Marquez (1998) finds that more stringent regulation coincides with a larger percentage of 
self employed workers, a finding confirmed by Maloney (2001), although the estimated impact was 
small compared to other education, productivity, or demographic variables.  
 
Theoretically, restrictions should reduce productivity growth although at present the evidence is 
sketchy:  The literature on the impact on productivity growth is thin at the international level and 
thinner still in Latin America.  Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), using a general equilibrium model 
for job creation and destruction, find that policies that interfere with the natural process of job 
creation/destruction at the firm level are quite costly in terms of average productivity and, more 
generally, in terms of aggregate welfare.
14 Parente and Prescott (1991, 2000) argue that TFP 
differences dominant differences in per capita GDP and that firing costs are one of the policies that 
increase the power of inside labor in a number of industries to resist changes in work practices and 
adoption of new technologies. Capelli (2000) and Hobjin and Jovanovic (2001-HJ) also show that 
stringent hiring and firing restrictions raise the cost of labor adjustments, which is often required 
after innovation occurs. A more recent analysis provided by Scarpetta and Tressel (2004), using firm 
OECD data, finds an impact of firing regulations on productivity and technological via its impact on 
the incentives to innovate and to adopt new technologies.
15  For Latin America, the results are very 
preliminary: Forthcoming research by Gracia and Santamaría (2004) find that at the aggregate level 
(national TFP), the substantial reduction of firing costs that occurred in 1990 in Colombia had a 
positive effect on the evolution of productivity growth. There is also a yet unexplored potential that 
poorly designed legislation discourages micro and small enterprises from participating in other 







•  Identifying the true costs of job protection.  Many of the findings above prove unstable or 
at the very least are probably not good guides on the true magnitudes of the impact of 
employment protections.  In particular, though an important literature stresses the 
productivity implications of legislation, to date documentation of these effects has been 
difficult. 
                                                 
14 In effect, HR find that a tax on dismissals equal to one year’s wages reduces average productivity by 2%. 
Consumption, on the other hand, is reduced by about 2.5% (these are long run-equilibrium effects). They find that the tax 
on job destruction creates a distortion that encourages firms to use resources less efficiently, with the result that 
productivity drops and fewer resources are devoted to the market sector of the economy. Being more specific, HR find 
that the channel through effect relates to the fact that when no dismissal costs are present, firms make their employment 
decisions based solely on the value of the marginal product of labor and the size and sign of the idiosyncratic shocks 
faced by the firm. However, when such costs are introduced, firms also base their employment decisions on the amount 
of labor used on previous periods, distorting such decision and making the aggregate marginal product of labor deviate 
from its equilibrium value. An important point is that in these base calculations, in which the tax on dismissals is set at 
20% of the wage, the total costs of such tax are small (about 5% of the payroll), and even then the productivity effects 
are large. Thus, the authors stress the importance of these distortions and claim that focusing only on their employment 
effects is a mistake. 
15 They mention three channels through which it is possible to observe the influence of legislation on innovation: (i) the 
system of industrial relations; (ii) the cost of hiring and firing workers; and (iii) the possible interactions between 
industry-specific technological characteristics and employment protection legislation, which lead to different human 
resources strategies. 
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•  Turnover and human capital accumulation.  Facilitating worker separations on either side 
of the transaction may reduce the incentive of firms to invest in training. The challenge is to 
understand how employment protection can provide some security to workers without 
introducing rigidities in the labor market and without reducing incentives for firms’ training  
investments.  This is the concern underlying various discussions of the hyperactive Latin 
labor market and whether it must be slowed down somehow.  
 
 
c. Designing New Employment Protection Mechanisms
16 
 
Unemployment safety nets are increasingly important to LAC for both economic and political 
economy reasons.  Perhaps because most countries legally proscribe firing workers for anything but 
gross misconduct, safety nets for unemployed workers have generally been weak and poorly 
designed.  Arguably, several factors have made their reform increasingly urgent.  First, the existing 
system serves neither firms nor workers well.  The legal barriers and the uncertainty and legal 
hassles to adjusting the workforce for economic reasons discourages innovation and the 
corresponding gains in worker productivity.  However, politically increased flexibility on the 
separations front must be packaged with credible improvements in the safety net. Second, the 
indemnizations promised workers in the case of unjust dismissals or firm failures pool risk in the 
least efficient fashion at the firm level: a firm on the verge of closing is least able to afford to pay 
workers.  Even in healthy firms, high litigation costs and uneven enforcement means workers in 
practice get less than dictated by law. And the informal sector is, by definition, uncovered by formal 
protections.  Third, declining inflation rates reduce the possibility of coordinated declines in real 
wages and increasingly force adjustment through quantities.
17  Fourth, although the data as yet do 
not suggest large effects as discussed above, foreign competition may be expected to increase the 
rate of firm failure and necessary workforce adjustments.  
 
Appropriate employment supports must be designed with an eye to cost. If they are financed out of 
labor taxes, they may impede employment growth. In fact, as is the case with all labor taxes, the true 
incidence depends on how much workers value the income security and how much of the implicit 
tax is considered a pure tax, combined with nominal rigidities in the system.  
 
…and optimal balancing of risk pooling and moral hazard.  The well documented moral hazard 
issues surrounding insurance manifest themselves, most obviously, in reduced job search.  In the 
literature, the tradeoff between the greater pooling and higher monitoring costs suggests that systems 
should focus on self insurance in the case where shocks are small and frequent and risk pooling 
mechanisms when shocks are infrequent and devastating.  To date, the research on Latin America 
has been better at documenting the moral hazard issues than identifying the precise structure of risk 
although generally, among the poor, unemployment is fairly frequent and short lived.  In this case, 
self insurance type system of individual saving accounts (ISA) where workers, the firm, or the 
government contribute to an account that the worker owns has been thought to offer the best 
                                                 
16 See background note by Cunningham (2004), De Ferranti et al (2000)  
17 Adjustment to the Mexican Peso crisis of 1995 was achieved by freeze nominal wages and allowing inflation to erode 
their real value spreading the costs across the entire population.  Unemployment rose relatively little and reached the 
lowest levels in decades within 3 years Maloney, Cunningham and Bosch (2004). Conversely, the burden of crisis was 
absorbed by the disproportionately poor unemployed in Argentina and Colombia where real wages could not or were 
note permitted to erode. World Bank (2001) Household Risk, Coping Strategies, and Coping in Urban Argentina Report 
No. 22426-AR   12
combination of ensuring funds for smoothing shocks and search while mitigating moral hazard.
18  
Kugler (2004), for instance, shows that moving to ISAs in Colombia led to shorter unemployment 
periods and higher post-unemployment wages.
19  The Brazilian program where workers could access 
their account only upon firing appeared to create the perverse incentive to lobby to be fired and the 
alternative pago a todo evento contemplated in Mexico may in fact stimulate turnover that perhaps 
discourages investments in human capital. 
 
In Brazil, which also had a true unemployment insurance program (UI) that pools risks and hence 
might be more prone to moral hazard, no improvement in matching, evidenced through higher wages 
was found, nor did the unemployment spells lengthen. However, those who collect UI were more 
likely to become self employed than those who did not, suggesting that UI is an alternative source of 
(hard to obtain) credit for firm start-up.
20  Similar results are found for training programs in 
Mexico.
21 Both examples suggest, again, the need to view the market in an integrated fashion- if 
poor formal sector workers seek to start their own businesses, UI programs designed without this in 
mind can facilitate a movement to informality.  
 
Informal insurance mechanisms still dominate household coping strategies.  As Fiszbein (2004) 
notes, Latin America has evolved something a truncated welfare state where formal social protection 
schemes are concentrated among the better off leaving large segments of the population not only 
poor but without defense against shocks.    
 
Private mechanisms may be more effective than thought.  Despite understandable, although perhaps 
unhelpful assertions of their imperfection, informal mechanisms seem moderately effective 
alternatives to formal coverage and the primary source of insurance in countries with limited UI 
mechanisms and large informal sectors.
22  In a striking example from Europe, Bentolila and Ichino 
(2000) argue that household incomes fell substantially less in Italy and Spain in response to 
unemployment of the household head than it did in Germany where formal protection systems were 
more advanced.  That said, the informal labor market itself cannot be complacently viewed as a 
safety net: in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, the sector generates roughly 60% of the flows into 
unemployment (consistent with self employed sectors showing high mortality rates everywhere) and 
generated the majority of the increase in unemployment during the Mexican crisis.
23  However, the 
existence of informal mechanisms for pooling risk at the family or community level blurs the line 
between “protected” and “unprotected” work and must be integrated into the design of incentives in 
overall social protection programs.  
 
However, informal mechanisms fail in the presence of covariate shocks:  Local pooling of risk 
mitigates the moral hazard of national programs, but often fails in the presence of prolonged 
                                                 
18 Gill, Indermit and Nadeem Ilahi (2000) “Economic Insecurity, Individual Behavior, and Social Policy” LCRCE/World 
Bank, unpublished manuscript. Guasch (1999) recommends a combined UI and individual savings account program 
where the ISA serves as a premium, and only once the ISA is depleted will a person collect UI   
19 Kugler, Adriana (2000) “Does Replacing Employer Insurance for Self-Insurance Improve the Performance of the 
Labor Market?  The Case of the Colombian Severance Payments Savings Accounts” LCRCE/World Bank, unpublished 
manuscript. 
20 Cunningham, Wendy (2000) “Unemployment Insurance in Brazil:  Unemployment Duration, Wages, and Sectoral 
Choice” LCRCE/World Bank, unpublished manuscript. Gonzaga (2003) 
21 Wodon, Quentin and C. Siaens (1999) “Training for the Urban Unemployed:  A Reevaluation of Mexico’s Probecat” 
in World Bank (ed) Government Programs and Poverty in Mexico, Report No. 19214-ME. 
22 In available studies a decrease of income by 10 percent leads to a fall in consumption by only one to four percent. See 
World Bank (2001) Household Risk, Self-Insurance, and Coping Strategies in Urban Argentina, Report No. 22426-AR 
(World Bank:  Washington, DC) for a review of the literature.  
23 See Fajnzylber, Maloney and Montes (2003) and Bosch and Maloney (2004)   13
covariate shocks.  For example, 80 percent of Argentines would turn to family, neighbors or friends 
if they became unemployed but only 40 percent would turn to this group in periods of wide-spread 
unemployment (World Bank 2001).
24  The large fraction of workers delinked from formal 
institutions and the relative frequency of large covariate shocks has led the region to experiment with 
three mechanisms which vary in goals and which depend to differing degrees on existing institutions 
for targeting and the quality of administrative capacity.
 25  Workfare programs such as Trabajar in 
Argentina self target by putting wages below market thereby being attractive only to those without 
other options.  The program was less successful in Colombia where legal barriers proscribe sub-
minimum wages payments; instead greater effort was put into conditional transfer programs that 
relied on well established targeting systems and training programs.  These tend to benefit the young 
and informal sector workers.  Conditional cash transfer programs tweaked with counter cyclical 
triggering devices can help families smooth crises while defusing somewhat concerns about 
asitencialismo, but they require existing household poverty mappings for targeting which can be 
administratively complex and are less well suited to target those affected by employment shocks. 







•  Nature of unemployment shocks.  A mapping of the probability, duration, and 
demographic distribution of employment shocks is, in theory, necessary to know whether 
systems should emphasize self insurance, as LAC has done, versus pooling risk through true 
UI as ECA has done.   
 
•  Quantification of effects on labor supply and remuneration.  As a complement, more 
research is needed on the magnitude of the moral hazard issues in terms of reduced search 
and hence higher unemployment. The most common areas of UI research in the US and 
European literature is the employment disincentive effects (to a much lesser extent) measured 
by unemployment duration and (to an even lesser extent) the re-employment wage effect.  
For LAC economies, a third issue – sector of re-employment – is also a highly relevant issue. 
 
•  Formal, informal and non-standard safety nets.   A better understanding of the efficacy 
of private safety nets is necessary so as not to crowd out mechanisms with good monitoring 
with public programs that are more subject to moral hazard. To the degree that informal 
mechanisms perform poorly, particularly during periods of highly covariate shocks, further 
exploration of alternate vehicles for channeling income support are necessary.  
 
•  Redistributional issues.  Taking the social protection program as a whole,  who pays and 
who benefits?  A UI program financed by the VAT, for instance, is a transfer to the 




                                                 
24 This has big implications on who is eligible for the program; in Brazil, for example, only 40 percent of the labor force 
is eligible for UI, and less than 10 percent of the unemployed benefit from the UI program. De Ferranti, et. al. (2000) 
25 See De Ferranti et al (2000) “Securing our Future” as well as Maloney (2003) for a discussion of the design of 
emergency programs.  
26 See also Fiszbein (2004): Beyond Truncated Welfare States:Quo Vadis Latin America” for a think piece on this topic.   14
d. Non-monetary labor costs  
 
By non-monetary wage costs we understand all those costs over and above the (monetary) salary 
directly received by the worker: labor taxes, Social Security contributions, bonuses, vacations, 
training contributions, family allowances etc.   
 
Non-monetary wage costs are paid by both firms and workers. . .  Marrufo (2001), Cox-Edwards 
(2001), Gruber (1997), and Mondino and Montoya (2002) find that workers absorb a large fraction 
of non-monetary wage costs (estimates range from 50 to 90 percent) in Mexico, Chile (Cox Edwards 
and Gruber) and Argentina, respectively. Heckman and Pages (2002) find similar results for a set of 
Latin American countries. 
 
. . . and may decrease employment and increase unemployment. Heckman and Pages find a robust 
negative effect of social security payments on employment and unemployment in a global sample, 
although the latter effect does not appear significant in the LAC sub-sample.  
 
To the degree that labor taxes exceed benefits, they provide an incentive to become informal. Poor 
enforcement of regulation gives workers the opportunity to avoid paying labor taxes if they calculate 
that the benefits received in the formal sector fall short of  those in the informal sector.   Mexico and 
Chile have worked to align costs and benefits of their social security programs to decrease the 
disincentive to informality by setting up individual accounts for pensions or to encourage formality; 
the results have been modest.  Clearly, such a realignment sharply limits the potential for using labor 
taxes for redistributive purposes. A small scale of operations and low and stagnant productivity 
hamper the ability of small firms to amortize these costs and pool workers’ risks efficiently, leading 
many to noncompliance with labor laws even if they become formal in other dimensions.   
 
. . . and may decrease productivity.  Montes and Santamaría(2004) and Gracia and Santamaría 
(2004) show a negative relationship between non wage costs and TFP growth at a sectoral level for 
México and Colombia. Although, at the conceptual level the relationship between non-wage costs 
and productivity is not as clear as the one between firing costs and productivity, there exist some 
channels through which such costs may affect productivity growth. Paramount among these is the 
fact that high non-wage costs may prevent firms from growing and registering (i.e. be informal), 
again preventing them from achieving economies of scale and making more difficult access to some 




•  Magnitude of effects and interactions with other policies.  A more precise estimate of 
the impacts of heavy non wage costs on labor demand and firms’ growth potential and 
how these change when firms are unable to pass them on to workers, for instance, in the 
presence of a minimum wage, would  be desirable.  
  
•  Links between benefits and taxes and the incentive to informality.  On the supply 
side, a better understanding of how perceived misalignment of payments and benefits 
affects the decision of workers to be informal is needed.   
 
 




Theoretically, the minimum wage offers a trade off between raising the incomes of poorer workers 
to provide a “living” wage and the possible negative employment effects that, taken as a group, may 
leave the poor potentially less well off.  
 
Minimum wages affect the distribution of wages… especially in the informal sector.  Despite 
concern about enforcement, kernel density plots suggest that the minimum wage is often binding and 
sometimes strongly, as in the case of Colombia.
28  Both studies also confirm as a general rule in the 
region, the existence of what Neri and others term the “efeito farol” or lighthouse effect, that the 
minimum wage is more binding in the informal than the formal sector. This adds support to the idea 
that the informal sector is not completely unprotected by social norms, but in fact is covered by 
notions of fair wages.   
 
Further, the wage is used as numeraire for wage gains throughout the distribution thus leveraging 
the effect even up to middle income workers.
29 This contrasts with the OECD where only youth 
whose wages are clustered around the minimum wage are affected.  
 
The minimum wage can be a tool for poverty and inequality reduction but it can be set too high 
and lead to greater income inequality.  The recent LAC regional study “Minimum Wages: 
Employment, Wages and Poverty”
30 commissioned studies of several countries and concluded that 
in countries with relatively low minimum wage levels,  the minimum wage increases the wages of 
poorer workers, has minimal effects on unemployment, and leads to an aggregate net increase in 
household labor income for the poor households.  It also reduces income inequality because the 
numeraire effects diminish to zero in higher earning households.
31 However, in Colombia, a country 
with relatively high minimum wages, Arango (2003) finds that the lost employment effect 
dominated the wage effect and led to an increase increased poverty and  an increase in household 
labor income inequality.  Thus, while a high minimum wage may serve a social justice objective, by 
setting it “too high,” it can have the opposite effect. 
 
Further, the most “vulnerable” workers are the first to be hurt by excessively high minimum 
wages.  Even where minimum wages are relatively low, the wages of young, low-skilled, and female 
workers benefit from a higher minimum wage – as do those of prime-aged, skilled, and male 
workers –, but the unemployment effects are also concentrated on them. Montenegro and Pages 
(2004) for example, find that, as with job security provisions, minimum wages reduce the 
employment probabilities of the young and unskilled.  In essence, their income as a group is 
redistributed to less vulnerable segments of the labor force. 
 
The unemployment effects imply a need to combine the minimum wage  with other social welfare 
tools.  While a well-targeted direct policy of tax and redistribute would most efficiently achieve the 
redistribution goals, the minimum wage may be a more realistic means for achieving this goal.  It 
avoids many of the pitfalls of other social policies: self targeting, market (rather than government) 
income redistribution, minimal public administration, no perverse labor supply incentives (receipt of 
benefit is contingent on being in the labor force), and it does not ring of paternalism 
                                                 
27 See background document by Cunningham. 
28 See Maloney and Nuñez (2004) Cunningham (2004). See also Gindling and Terrel for Costa Rica who  nonetheless 
find no impact in the informal sector. 
29 See Maloney and Nunez (2004), Fajnzylber (2002), Cunningham et al (2004), Garcia Verdu (2003).. 
30 Cunningham (2004) 
31 See Cunningham, Neumark and Siga 2004 for Brazil, Maloney and Nunez(2004) for Colombia   16
(asistencialismo)   or political favoritism (clientelismo) as the beneficiaries are selected by the 
market.  However, the unemployment impact on the most vulnerable workers suggests the   
importance, again, of taking an integrated view of social protection and to maintaining the 
complementarities of the various elements in mind.  Raising wages to provide a decent standard of 
living for workers necessitates implementing some type of income security scheme for those who 
lose to guarantee that the target groups will experience a net benefit.  
 
The minimum wage can be a severe barrier to macro economic adjustment.  The US and European 
literature is inconclusive on this issue. However, the critical difference in how Mexico and Colombia 
adjusted to their relative recessions of the 1990s appears in mandated maintenance, and in fact 
increase, in the real value of the minimum wage during the crisis.  This led not only to high and 
sustained levels of unemployment, but to a severe case of classic formal/informal dualism.
32   
 
Minimum wages are costly to public finances.  Social expenditures are closely tied to the minimum 
wage, so any increase in the minimum wage also has large implications for the public deficit.  The 
largest expenditure categories that are affected is the public sector wage bill, where a 10 percent 
increase in the minimum wage would increase total government expenditure by 1.4 percent in 
Panama, for example, and the pension system, where, for example, a 10 percent increase in the 
minimum wage in Brazil would increase pension payouts by 3.3 times more than the increase in 
receipts.  In addition, other social benefits ranging from salary bonuses to job training stipends to 
“shock benefits” (death in the family, birth, marriage, etc.) are denominated in minimum wages, and 
eligibility for social programs are tied to it. 
 
Careful thought should be given to structure minimum wage institutions for it to be an effective 
policy tool.  Its objectives should be kept narrow and the expectations of its ability to resolve social 
inequity kept modest.  Changes in minimum wages should be informed by the evolution of labor 
productivity. A simple structure is easier to enforce and attempting to address all segments of the 
workforce generally fails. Both facilitate enforcement. The impact on the fiscal position is important 





•  Identification of the “right” minimum wage  .  The minimum wage regional study 
documented one country where the minimum wage reduced poverty by benefiting the poorest 
(Mexico), and two countries with higher minimum wages where the impact was neutral or 
even detrimental to the poor.  Thus, the question remains, what is the “correct” level of the 
minimum wage such that it is high enough to maximize benefits for the poor, without tipping 
the balance such that it benefits other groups to the detriment of the poor.  More country 
studies, with varying levels of the minimum would allow for a more complete picture. 
 
•  Who benefits from minimum wage increases.  Contrary to the US and Western Europe, 
where the minimum is mostly collected by youth, in LAC primary workers are also minimum 
wage earners and to date there is poor understanding of the overall profile of the minimum 
wage earner and hence the types of complementary social safety nets that are necessary. 
 
 
                                                 




Unions differ greatly in character throughout Latin America, but commonalities emerge in their 
impacts on: the profitability of the firms, investment and technology, wage and employment 
determination, and the size of the unregulated informal labor market in Latin America.  
 
Unions decrease firm profitability: Several studies for Latin American countries are consistent with 
the OECD literature that in advanced countries union power tends to harm business profitability. 
Saavedra and Torero (2002) show decreasing profitability for firms in the presence of unions for 
Peru during the period 1994-1996  Similar evidence if found for Brazil by Menezes-Filho, 
Zylberstajn, Chahad and Pazello (2002) where they use the Annual Industry Survey pooled for the 
period 1988-1998. However, the results become inconclusive when observing the performance over 
time. Cassoni, Labadie and Fachola (2002) present preliminary evidence of a negative impact of 
unionization in profitability for Uruguay, though they acknowledge further work needs to be done.  
Urizar and Lee (2003) argue that in spite of low union density, productivity in coffee producers 
firms in Guatemala suffer greatly in the presence of Unions.  
 
The impact on aggregate employment is unclear, but there is evidence of efficient bargaining. The 
mainstream “efficient bargaining” models stress how in the presence of firm monopoly power, 
unions may choose to direct their negotiated share of rents toward either higher wages or 
employment. Hence, their impact on total employment may differ from standard “right to manage” 
models where unions raise wages and firms move along the demand curve to reduce employment. 
Maloney and Ribeiro (2001) find a strong impact on employment in Mexico, but little on wages, 
consistent with an extreme “efficient bargaining” model.  Both Saba Arbache (2002) and Menezes-
Filho et al (2002) find wage effects, and the latter work finds positive employment effects of unions 
as well.  Menezes also finds a concave relationships where some union concentration raises both 
wages and salaries, consistent with efficient bargaining, but after a point leads to deleterious 
employment effects.  In Uruguay, Cassoni, Labadie and Fachola (2002) also find that unionization 
promotes both higher wages and higher levels of employment.
34 Though suggesting that unions may 
increase employment in their host firm, the firm level analyses cannot capture  economy wide 
effects.  Some labor codes, for instance, dictate that negotiated contracts cover all firms regardless of 
size, and are widely seen as imposing inflexibility and hardship on smaller firms.   
 
 
More importantly, unions may pose a barrier to technological adoption although the empirical 
work to date is only suggestive. The theoretical literature does not unambiguous conclude how 
unions impact innovation. Hjalmaarson (1990) suggests that Swedish unions understand the link 
between technological upgrading and wages increases and aggressively encourage firms to adopt 
new techniques.  Parente and Prescott (2000) argue that more commonly unions focus on the short 
term goal of protecting jobs at a great cost in foregone productivity gains.  US studies find 
consistently negative impacts of unions on R&D but this is not so clear for European countries, 
which seem to bargain more on employment rather than wages. To date, there is little evidence for 
Latin America on which to report.  One of the few examples is Reis and Crespo (2004) who, using 
information for 1600 firms in Brazil, find evidence that labor legislations restrict firms to hire 
relatively more skilled workers which may, in fact, push toward more technological adoption. On the 
other hand, a case study of the aviation sector by Garcia Verdu (2004) suggests negative impact of 
                                                 
33 See Background paper by Bosch and Siga 2004 
34 They argue, somewhat counter-intuitively,  however, that the channel through which these changes occur is 
substitution of labor by capital.     18
union job protection actions on technological upgrading equipment which then permit potential 
productivity gains. 
 
…and to maintaining the quality of public services, such as education. A recent literature stresses 
how public sector unions may impede the necessary upgrading of public services. Alejandro Foxley 
(2004), Finance minister under the first democratic government of Chile, sees union efforts to 
prevent measuring educational quality and their resistance to reform as the largest barrier to the 
further reduction of poverty in Chile.  Similar accounts are found in Mexico (Washington Post on 
7/14/ 2004) where education unions are seen as corrupt vehicles for patronage that block even basic 
quality standards, such as requiring that teachers show up for class.  Similarly, Mexican public sector 
unions are the main obstacle to reforming the financially unsustainable public pension system.  In 
Argentina, Murillo et al find indirect evidence of a negative effect of teacher’s unions on student 
performance coming through excessive emphasis on job stability and increased conflict.  Zegara and 
Ravina (2003) find no similar impact either way of unionization in Peru.  Given the central role of 
education in both poverty reduction and technological advancement, this is a central, and under 
researched, element of union influence in the developing world.  The implications for poverty 
reduction and country innovative capacity are almost axiomatic.  
 
The evidence on the impact on informality is thin:  If the rents from efficient bargaining are 
channeled into more formal employment and only to a lesser degree toward higher wages, as appears 
to be the case in several countries, then we might expect few deleterious impacts on the levels of 
formality.  On the other hand, to the degree that firms subcontract to the sector to avoid union power, 
a subject on which there is virtually no research, we could expect increasing informality.  Recent 
empirical evidence provided by Galli and Kucera (2004) for a sample of 14 Latin American 
countries suggest that countries with higher “civic rights,” including the right to free association, 
collective representation and free expression of grievances, develop higher shares of formal 
employment, arguing that the positive effects of civic rights more than offset any negative effect due 




•  Technological Progress.  How much do unions really obstruct technological adoption?  
 
•  Public sector quality.  To date, there  is insufficient data to evaluate school performance 
(Ornelas 2004) or to document the channels, for instance  resistance to curriculum changes or 
teacher evaluations or discipline,  which may impede progress. 
 
•  Centralized v. decentralized Unions.  As pointed out by Carneiro et al. (2001), there is a 
literature that argues that the extremes of collective bargaining are best. Either wages are set 
centrally and coordinated by the three parts involved (government, private sector, and 
unions) or at a firm level. The worst case, allegedly, is when there is no national level 
coordination, but all firms within an industry are bound by agreements perhaps inappropriate 
to them. Mexico seems to provide a case where the centralized bargaining was able to reduce 
inflation and coordinate a big fall in wages during the crisis that allowed it to recover fast, 
but until the present no work has been conducted in this direction. 
 




Worker training is a right in many countries.  Ongoing upgrading of the work force through training, 
particularly in rapidly evolving industries, is a central element of the national innovation system.  
 
Training tends to have a positive impact on productivity. . .  In general, the available rigorous 
empirical evaluations of training programs find that training increases firm-level productivity, (Tan 
and Lopez-Acevedo, 2003; Barrera and Higuera, 2004 among others for LAC). The impact on 
subsequent earnings is less clear, the productivity increases can translate into higher wage premiums 
but especially for skilled workers. Firm investments in training tend to pay off particularly when 
training takes place in-house and benefits already skilled workers. Further, it has been found that 
increased continuity of training leads to larger impact on productivity than does intermittent training.  
 
...and is complementary to firm R&D and technology adoption. Firm-level data show that firms 
that are capital intensive and/or invest in R&D and technological change are more likely to train 
workers (Barrera and Higuera, 2004; Gill, Dar, and Fluitman, 1998, and Tan and Batra, 1995b and 
1997).  
 
Larger firms are more likely to provide training in the Caribbean, Colombia, Mexico, and LAC in 
general.
36  Small firms may be more constrained by resources, lack knowledge about training 
benefits, invest less and have higher labor turnover rates than large firms (De Ferranti, 2003).  Some 
evidence from Mexico suggests that membership of a union raises the likelihood of receiving 
training (Lopez Acevedo 2002). 
 
Training is not a substitute for good schools. Firms overwhelmingly choose to train skilled 
(secondary education or above) workers.  This is an exceptionally robust finding that is salient in 
cross-country household surveys, administrative databases, and firm panel data sets. Although the 
likelihood of training increases with all levels of education, the critical threshold seems to be 
completion of secondary education.. This most likely reflects the idea that investment in training 
requires a sufficient prior skill base in order to pay-off. This pattern is consistent with the pattern of 
returns to training.  Overall, firms rarely invest into basic skills of a worker, rather focusing on 
specific job related skills.  
 
The efficacy of training differs by provider and modality. Studies of programs in Mexico find that 
on-the-job training in Mexico is more effective than classroom training. Further, private training 
centers seem to out-perform public training centers in the Caribbean, Colombia and Brazil 
(McArdler and Blom, forthcoming, Barrera and Higuera, 2004 and World Bank, 2004). 
 
The majority of firms in the LAC region receive training from private providers.  In the LAC 
region, only 16% of enterprises use public institutes for external training (Batra, 2001b).  Private 
sector providers – firms themselves, industry associations, buyers and equipment suppliers, and 
private training institutes and colleges – are more important than government-run training 
institutions as sources of training. Naturally, there exists a large variation within the region. In Chile 
and Uruguay, employers rely mostly on private external training sources, whereas firms in other 
countries, such as Belize, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Trinidad and Tobago, involve public training 
suppliers to a larger extent (Marquez, 2002; Cinterfor 2001, and De Ferranti et al., 2003). In almost 
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all countries, the private firm training is not formally recognized by the public training and education 
system. Thus reducing the worker’s incentive for training.  
 
The public training programs in Latin America and the Caribbean differ substantially in design.  
In all countries of the region, training programs derive their financing from payroll levies earmarked 
for the purpose which varies from less than 0.5 percent to 3 percent of the payroll.  Beyond this, 
there is great variety in design.  In Chile, training is publicly stimulated through incentive programs 
to private providers; in  Brazil, a tri-partite organization organizes training through a mix of public 
and private providers. In Colombia and Jamaica, apex organizations administer, regulate and provide 
training for the work force via large public training institutes with limited private sector linkages. 
Recently, the movement is away from public provision which is often seen as huge an ineffectual,  
towards incentive based programs relying on non-governmental providers for training. This implies 
(i) a decentralization of the training decisions to the company, and (ii) a separation of financing of 
training from provision of training. 
 
Further Work 
•  More rigorous evaluations of training programs in the region. Most evaluations are based 
on descriptive data with little or no control of other relevant variables. Good practices of 
impact evaluations and, in particular, policies to foment a culture of monitoring and 
evaluation of training program would be of high value (examples of evalutions of youth 
training programs can be found for Chile’s Chile Joven (Aedo, 2002) and Peru’s Projoven 
(Nopo et.al. 2003))   
•  Training for poorly educated workers. Since training is focused on workers with 
secondary education or above, it is not clear what to do with school dropouts that lack the 
basic skills to “be trainable” from a firm perspective.  Research into successful training 
programs of low-skilled youth and the appropriate modes of delivery and financing would be 
valuable. Further, should scarce public financing be devoted either to induce firm training of 
skilled workers with a proven return, or to finance training for unskilled workers with a 
shown lower return?. There might be also a role for targeted adult education programs, 
especially in countries with high illiteracy of the labor force, considering not only the 
potential direct earnings impacts but also the effects on children’s schooling attainment. 
•  Optimal goverment intervention in training systems.  If implemented, the above 
recommendations of separation of finance and provision would imply an unregulated private 
market with a public subsidy. It’s not clear whether this would be sufficient or whether there 
a new role for public training commissions/regulators to (i) certify private providers of 
training; (ii) build so-called lifelong learning/competency systems; (iii) subsidize technical 
assistance to SMEs for developing of HR strategies; and (iv) other responsibilities. A number 
of LAC countries, notably Chile, Mexico, Colombia, and Jamaica are currently pursuing at 
least one of the above possibilities. 
•  Moving forward reforms While few policymakers doubt the direction of change, there has 
been strong opposition to reform, since (i) the beneficiaries of public training programs rarely 
see the costs of training programs and the programs therefore enjoy popular support, and (ii) 
the employees of the training institutions have vested interests.  This has implied frequent 
and unproductive backtracking of reforms in a number of LAC countries, most notably 
Colombia, while in many others reforms are not being even discussed. Research into the 
relationship between the extent of reforms (public provision v. public incentive programs for 
private training) and the impact would be valuable.  Further, what are the critical elements of 
a reform of public training institutions that makes a reform palatable for all stakeholders?   21
The political economy of Labor Market Regulation Reform 
 
The general conclusion, as Heckman and Pages(2004) stress is that labor regulation does matter 
although at present the empirics are largely restricted to identifying the sign and significance of the 
effect.  A major outstanding agenda, then, is to identify more precisely how important these effects 
really are.  In some cases, such as Colombia, the tight coincidence of the perverse behavior of the 
minimum wage during the crisis with the rise in unemployment and informality suggests that the 
impacts can be very large.  On the other hand, it is less clear still how much of a gain in employment 
or formalization might be gained with reforms of other institutions.   
 
Yet labor market reform is the area where the region has been less intrepid. Even when policymakers 
are upbeat they fear that strong opposition to reform from unions and public opinion is not worth 
spending their often limited political capital. Businesses themselves tend to adopt a view narrowly 
focused on flexibilization, and key potential beneficiaries are often unorganized to participate 
productively. Weak and over stretched Labor Ministries are often uncapable of leading the complex 
process of dialogue and communication needed to make reforms feasible and assume the more 
complex oversight role that reforms might entail. A better understanding of the critical elements to 
make reforms attractive for all stakeholders is needed. The political economy may be facilitated by 
capitalizing on synergies of advancing multiple reforms, for example investment climate reforms, to 
the extent that addressing other (first order) constraints to job creation may ease job loss concerns. 
 
IV. Equity and poverty 
 
a. Poverty and inequality
37  
The labor market is perhaps the central conduit from growth to household poverty and inequality.  
Labor earnings count for over 70% of total household income in most LAC countries. Urban labor 
markets, in particular, are taking a more prominent role with migration and shrinking of the 
agricultural sector. Across the 1990s, the hourly earnings distribution became more unequal in 
Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Nicaragua, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela although in the rest of the 
region changes were very small or, in the case of the largest market, Brazil, the distribution 
improved.  These earning movements do not necessarily translate into changes in household income 
inequality.  Velez (2003) for example, finds that the increasing wage dispersion was offset by an 
increase in female labor participation among poor households.  
Labor institutions can influence the distribution of income and poverty.  As discussed in the 
previous section,  minimum wages are very binding among informal workers and less frequently but 
sometimes very significantly among the formal at relatively high levels of income.  And, as noted 
earlier, the union impact may be mixed either because they put little pressure on wages, or because 
of non-linearities in the impact of union power, or, as in the odd case of Brazil, union power appears 
correlated with higher dispersion.  Taking an aggregate view, Calderon, Chong and Valdes (2004), 
using a panel of 121 countries from 1970-2000 argue that de jure regulations seem to have no impact 
on income distribution, but de facto regulations do weakly.  Partially confirming the results above, 
they find that minimum wages worsen income inequality, while trade membership improves, 
government employment, and mandated benefits - proxied by maternity leave – reduce income 
inequality.  Ratification of the ILO convention 87 and social security contributions do not have a 
robust impact.   
Overly protective labor regulations may prevent micro firms from growing:  By tilting the cost-
benefit ratio of firms and workers towards informality, poorly designed legislation may  discourage 
                                                 
37 See background paper by Arias and Diaz (2004)   22
micro and small enterprises from capitalizing the productivity gains that come with scale economies 
and innovation. If, as discussed above, micro firms undertake a cost-benefit analysis of engaging in 
formality, extraordinarily high registration costs that are endemic to the region  (Janson and 
Chalmers 2001), or heavy labor taxes may create a poverty trap: due to low productivity firms 
cannot afford to comply with business and labor regulations, and informality in turn constrains 
economies of scale and productivity growth..  
However, the bulk of earnings differentials and thus poverty and income inequality in LAC is not 
generated by the labor market but largely reflects the productivity levels and differences in workers’ 
endowments. Labor markets do not seem to operate with pervasive segmentation. The residual 
earnings disparities associated with gender, ethnicity, race, informality (micro-firms and self 
employed), occupation, sector of employment, and geographic location are of second order and their 
reduction would have a larger impact on inequality than on poverty, which is symptomatic of overall 
low labor productivity. Labor reforms to date have indeterminate effects.  As Saavedra (2003) notes, 
the effects of changes on labor market outcomes in the region have been modest partly because of 
the simultaneous imposition of reforms with offsetting effects.  
But the explanations for observed changes in inequality are probably to be found elsewhere, 
namely through general reforms undertaken. Behrman, Birdsall and Szekely (2003) found that 
financial reform, capital account liberalization and tax reform have contributed to increased earnings 
inequality, while privatization was a force towards equalization.  The reforms worsened inequality in 
the short-run, but this effect tended to fade away over time.  
Or skill biased technical change. As been found elsewhere in the literature, Behrman et. al’s 
estimates suggest that trade openness had no effects whatsoever on inequality, instead they suggest 
that skill biased technological progress (SBTC) rather than trade per se has been the mechanism 
through which the reforms have been operating. Sánchez-Páramo and Schady (2003) reached a 
similar conclusion using repeated cross-section data for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and 
Mexico. In particular they suggest that even though the direct effect of trade liberalization on 
earnings inequality may be small, trade is an important source of technology transmission. However 
IADB (2004) argue that even when many economic sectors in LA countries have acquired new 
technologies after the period of trade and financial liberalization, changes in technology are far from 
being the unique source behind the trend in earnings differentials. In particular, trends in gender 
earnings gaps and the evolution of earnings for high-tech workers (such as engineers and computer 
science graduates) are difficult to reconcile with predictions from any version of the SBTC 
hypothesis. Moreover, some care must be taken in interpreting the results on the rising average 
returns to higher education and their relationship to relative demand shifts. While these demand 
shifts are likely to play a key role in rising earnings inequality, the observed upward trends can also 
reflect partially the upgrading of the unobservable skills of the labor force.  
 
The unequalizing role of unmeasured workers characteristics   Most of the disparity in wages 
cannot be generally explained by observed characteristics. Increasing evidence based on quantile 
regressions indicates the existence of unobserved wage heterogeneity among individuals with the 
same education, sector of work (formal/informal), gender, age and experience. Factors such as the 
quality of education, family background, individual ability, and labor market connections are 
distributed unevenly across workers. These unobserved (by the analyst) characteristics may grant an 
advantage in access to high paying jobs, affecting both human capital accumulation decisions and its 
returns in the labor market. In particular, numerous studies for LAC and developed countries point 
that returns to schooling increase along the earnings distribution so that for example the high return 
to college is not available to all workers alike.
38 There is also evidence that other earnings gaps 
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including gender, race and sector of employment vary in a meaningful way for workers at different 
points of the conditional earnings distributions. The contribution of this “within” group earnings 
inequality to total inequality and the potential role of public policies, including labor market 
interventions, has not received sufficient attention in the policy discussions.  
 
Further Work 
•  The role of unobserved wage determinants  More work needs to be done to understand the 
role of unobserved  determinants of earnings such as deficiencies in early-childhood 
development, education quality and labor market connections that would signal incentives for 
skill investments, ensure completion of full courses of basic education, and allow for 
transitions to higher education thus leveling the initial playing field and reducing the wage 
disparities. 
•  Identification of possible poverty traps Labor market signals and feedback effects to 
human capital accumulation through the pricing of labor (earnings returns), barriers to micro 
firms accessing public services broadly defined, the impact of unions, and other labor 
protections on educational or health services deserve greater attention as potential sources of 
poverty traps. 
•  Indirect links to distribution What other factors besides SBTC may be driving the observed 
increase in earnings gaps and how do existing institutions interact with these factors and 
agents’ responses to them  
 
 
b. Women in the labor market
39 
 
Labor Force Participation trends are converging.  Over the last 40 years, women’s labor force 
participation has increased in all countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, while men’s has 
decreased.  The proportion of working adult women ranged from 12 percent (Dominican Republic) 
to 54 percent (Jamaica) in 1960 and by 2000, the range was between 37 percent (Peru) and 74 
percent (Jamaica).  Men’s participation, on the other hand, declined from approximately 92 percent 
across the region to 85 percent by the end of the century.  Not surprisingly, women’s share of the 
labor force also increased over this period, from approximately 20 percent of the labor force to one-
third of all workers.  
 
Women’s participation is driven by education, urbanization and late marriage: The diverging 
trends are due to several factors that differ by gender.  First, educational attainment has increased in 
the region (World Development Indicators) leading to higher human capital for women, and thus 
labor force entry among those whose value was previously higher in the home (Blau 1998), but a 
decrease in male labor force participation as boys spend more time in school rather than entering the 
labor market.  Over this period, the growth in women’s education attainment exceeded that of men, 
and in some urban centers in Latin America, women’s stock of education, particularly that of young 
women, exceeds that of men.  Second, rapid urbanization has lead to a formalization of the work 
relationship so women, who are often invisible workers in rural family businesses, became visible 
employees in the cities.  Third, women are marrying later, and thus must work to support themselves 
(Demographic and Health Surveys).  Finally, the emergence of frequent economic shocks and 
unemployment in the region has increased the need for female labor to cushion the household from 
negative income shocks (Geldstein 2000, World Bank 2000, Cunningham 2000). 
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Female unemployment rates are above those of males in all countries in Latin America This 
reflects a world-wide trend which the US and European literature suggests is due to women’s role as 
secondary earner in the household that permits for longer spells of unemployment, the difficulty in 
finding employment that allows for the competing demands on women’s time, and women’s 
frequent entry and exit from the labor force, resulting in more frequent unemployment spells and 
their lower attachment to it, leading to longer search periods (Blau and Ferber, 1992). 
 
While women participate less in the labor market than men, their labor in the household far exceeds 
that of men.  Homecare is more than a full time job for women who do not work outside the 
household (49 hours weekly among married Mexican women, for example) while it is a substantial 
part time job for those who do (33 hours weekly).  Men, on the other hand, spend approximately 5 
hours weekly in housework, regardless of own, or spouse’s employment status (Cunningham and 
Jacobsen 2004). 
 
Women are  disproportionately informal.  While women generally make up approximately one-
third of the LAC labor force, they account for approximately half of all informal wage jobs, are 
over-represented in the self employment sector and are underrepresented in the formal sector 
(Cunningham 2001).  Further, Markov transition matrices suggest women have exaggerated rates of 
transition between self employment and being out of the labor force (Bosch and Maloney 2004). 
 
But this seems largely a result of balancing home and work responsibilities:  A body of 
sociological work (Geldstein  2000, Chant 1991, Gonzalez de Rocha 1994), supported by survey 
data shows that women have a higher preference for unstructured work environments and shifts than 
men.  Women disproportionately cite “the need to care for the household” as their reason for being 
self employed, contract workers, or informal wage earners; where the flexible work shifts and work 
locations allow them to more easily fulfill their gender roles as primary caregivers of the households 
(Cunningham and Gomez 2004). Further, informal work also permits the easy and relatively 
frequent entry and exit from the labor market, which is characteristic of women’s labor histories.  
Partly due to household responsibilities, partly due to their role as safety nets when the household 
experiences a negative income shock (Cunningham 2001, World Bank 2001), female turnover is 
much higher than men’s.   
 
This view of largely home responsibility-induced informality is borne out when the patterns of single 
and married women are broken out.  Unmarried women without children, who have few domestic 
responsibilities are even more represented in the formal sector than are men while married women 
are over-represented in the unpaid labor sector.
40  Men’s sector of employment does not differ by 
marital or parental status suggesting the importance of child care responsibilities (Cunningham 
2001).  Further, single, childless women’s transition matrices are statistically indistinguishable from 
those of men. This said, employers also know female turnover patterns, and may discriminate for 
statistical reasons against young women in filling formal jobs. In some countries (eg., Bolivia), labor 
regulations still contain provisions such as a shorter work week, prohibition of night work, weak 
regulations of domestic work and maternity benefits paid by employers and non-transferable to 
husbands, all of which hinder better quality employment for women. 
 
Occupational segregation by gender remains a defining characteristics of Latin American labor 
markets.  The Duncan index (proportion of men and women who would have to trade occupations to 
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create gender equality) is approximately 35 percent in the region, and even higher when using 3-digit 
occupational codes.  Women are over-represented in the service and managerial occupations while 
men dominate in manufacturing and professional fields (Cunningham and Jacobsen 2004).   
Occupational choice may be due to discrimination at some time over the life cycle, or based on 
family decision and competing time demands in future life. 
 
Men earn more than women, but the wage gap is rapidly shrinking: By 1997, women’s median 
hourly wage was higher than men’s in Argentina and Costa Rica, and was 90 percent of men’s 
hourly wage in several other countries.  While monthly wage gaps show a larger gap, it is important 
to note that women work approximately 1/3 fewer hours per month as men.  Very little of the wage 
gap can be attributed to differences in observable characteristics.  Working women and men are 
approximately the same age and have similar levels of education.  Instead, the wage gap is almost 
fully due to unobservable characteristics, which may include everything from discrimination 
(Oaxaca 1973) to incentives created by legislation (Haro, unpublished) to self selection (Akerlof and 
Kranton 2000) to occupational preferences (Cunningham and Jacobsen 2004) to unobserved 
differences in job experience (Blau 1998) to “personal choices made outside the work environment” 
(Furchtott-Roth and Stolbs 1999).  Blom and Azevedo find no evidence of differences in training 
received by gender in any occupation. There is evidence of potential greater pay discrimination at 
the higher salary jobs at any given skill level. Montenegro (2001) shows that in Chile the gap 
increases as women move up along the earnings distribution, going from 10 percent in the bottom 
part of the distribution to about 40 percent in upper part. 
 
Future Work:  Potential areas for future work in understanding the importance of gender in the 
labor market include: 
 
  Identifying the sources of the unobserved portion of wage gaps.  To improve wage equity, 
particularly as education attainment rates converge, it is necessary to better understand those 
factors that cause persistent wage gaps.  Labor market data that are commonly collected are 
not sufficient, since they do not include information on the most likely causes of the observed 
gap:  differences in actual, as opposed the generally measured potential level of labor market 
experience, differential accumulation of human capital due to differential school experiences, 
the role of household responsibilities, occupational choice decisions, labor turnover, 
differential preferences by gender, skill obsolescence and employer preferences, to name a 
few. 
 
  The role of the informal sector.  The differential participation rates in these sectors begs the 
question of whether the attractive characteristics of informal sector work for women can be 
(or need be) replicated in the monitored and more protected formal sector.  This requires a 
better understanding of the motivation for informal sector work – an area that sociologists 
have much to teach economists 
 
  Labor legislation.  There is virtually no discussion of the incentives created for employees 
and employers via labor legislation.  However, anecdotal evidence suggests that sex-specific 
labor legislation actually creates incentives to discriminate against women (with parallel, but 
much fewer, distortions for men).  A more careful consideration of the laws in order to even 
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c. Race and Ethnicity 
 
Numerous studies have found important differences in conditional average earnings among 
different racial and ethnic groups.  Hall and Patrinos (2004), using Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions 
find unexplained earning gaps of between 26 and 60% for males in Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala 
Mexico and Peru in a comprehensive study discussing diverse aspects of inequality (income, 
education, health, etc.). Cunningham and Jacobsen (2003) find similar estimates between ethnic 
groups and Brazil’s racial groups, but nearly no difference between Guyana’s racial groups.  Nopo, 
Saavedra and Torero (2004) find that after controlling for a large set of characteristics, there are 
racially related earnings differentials among wage earners favoring predominantly non-indigenous 
individuals in Peru. In this and other studies clear –but not well understood- differences in 
occupational structures arise. Similar to gender there is evidence of potential greater pay 
discrimination for workers at the best paid jobs within any skills set.  For instance, Arias, Yamada 
and Tejerina (2004) find that in Brazil while the labor market rewards the educational investments of 
pardos similar to those of white workers located at the top of the adjusted wage scale, pardos at the 
bottom are rewarded similar to pretos. Nonetheless, at present, no consensus has been reached on 
whether these differences are mainly due to other unmeasured productivity factors historical 
characteristics or to what degree this is part of a consistent discriminatory pattern preventing 
minorities to access a better status.
41  
 
Cunningham and Jacobsen (2003) De Ferranti et al. (2003) devote a chapter to understand race and 
gender differences dividing the sample in white/non-indigenous male, white/non-indigenous female, 
indigenous male, and indigenous female. Using a methodology developed by Bourguignon et al. 
(2002) they simulate earnings of the “disadvantaged” group as if they were treated as the 
“advantaged” group and conclude that, although, there are between group disparities, within group 
variance explains most of the overall inequality observed. Moreover, Arias, Yamada and Tejerina 
(2004) find that the earnings gaps associated to skin color in Brazil are of second order after 
accounting for racial differences in family background and education quality. This has a strong 
policy implication since it is feasible that just targeting poor people might be the best way to reduce 
indigenous- non-indigenous gap.  Still, a better understanding of the extent and mechanism of 





•  Unpack the “unexplained component” of Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions.  Parallel to 
the suggested future work for gender, little is known about the factors behind half of the 
wage gap between ethnic and some racial groups.  Also, why is a wage gap not identified 
between racial groups in some countries?  However, the ethnic and racial work has an 
additional dimension, which is better understanding how to identify and define the ethnically 
and/or racially diverse populations, which would allow for such analysis. 
 
•  Conduct experimental research to document discrimination:  Methods analogous to those 
in the US which submit resumes differing only in racial background offer alternative 
measures of true discrimination (Handbook of Labor Economics 2001).  More study of the 
ways institutions may be exclusionary, even if not discriminatory per se is also a priority. 
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•  Labor legislation:  Many countries have enacted laws that prohibit racial discrimination in 
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